Cheques and imbalances?

In his inauguration speech, President Obama famously rejected as false the choice between America’s safety and its ideals. Has the new administration honoured this commendable position in political practice? After more than a year of steering American security, a fact-check appears to be in order.

I want to do this here with respect to intelligence governance. Examining first whether or not the new government has kept its promises, I then elaborate on  the driving forces behind the recent developments in this arcane domain.

Intelligence governance under Obama …

Unsurprisingly, the field of intelligence is replete with opportunities for the Obama administration to demonstrate its commitment to an « unprecedented level of openness » and its desire to « restore the standards of due process and core constitutional values that have made this country great ».

Under G.W. Bush, intelligence governance has severely damaged America’s international reputation. Key strategic decisions (such as the invasion of Iraq) were based on flawed and heavily politicised intelligence, US intelligence agents conducted torture and extraordinary renditions on suspected terrorists (often on the basis of equally flawed intelligence, see, for example, the el-Masri case), and the NSA engaged in illegal surveillance/wire-tapping of US citizens.

Unfortunately, this is only a selection of the most stinking turds that President Obama has found under the rugs of the White House upon his arrival. (For a fuller scope, see the ACLU’s Torture Report). On his first full day in office, Barack Obama has responded to this rather unpleasant dowry by promising the restoration of constitutional values. How did that go and what does the process reveal about the master and servants of US intelligence governance?

… remains murky and profoundly undemocratic

To say it upfront, the track record is rather sombre thus far.

The first executive orders (ie. no more secret prisons, the closure of Guantànamo, an unequivocal prohibition of torture) were very much in keeping with his original pledge. The administration deserves credit for its resolve – even if the deadline for the closure of Gitmo has not been met. Shortly afterwards, however, this earlier commitment became less visible – sometimes hardly distinguishable even from the  « Bush/Cheney template » (Glenn Greenwald).

For example, I would argue that Obama shunned the rule of law principle by demanding fellow Americans to look forward and not backwards with respect to the misguided counter-terrorism policies of his predecessor. Make no mistake, this is code for blocking rigorous accountability proceedings on the various instances of malfeasance that occurred under his predecessors’ watch. Sadly, despite ubiquitous calls for a New Church Inquiry, Obama remains steadfast on this mistaken position to look forward. How can the US government look into the future without drawing the lessons from the troubled past? Oversight, one should add, is not primarily a witchhunt. Rather, it allows a nation to come clean and ameliorate its policies and regulatory framework.

Against this backdrop, consider how Obama’s surprising choice for the position of the new CIA director, Leon Panetta, justifies the government’s policy to evade accountability:

« Together, the CIA and Congress must find a balance between appropriate oversight and a recognition that the security of the United States depends on a CIA that is totally focused on the job of defending America. [...] Intelligence can be a valuable weapon, but it is not one we should use on each other. As the president has said, this is not a time for retribution. Debates over who knew what when — or what happened seven years ago — miss a larger, more important point: We are a nation at war in a dangerous world, and good intelligence is vital to us all. That is where our focus should be. »

Marcy Wheeler, a very sharp and prolific blogger, exposes the real intention behind this line of reasoning. She observes that the CIA director

« seems to suggest that pursuing the question of « who knew what when–or what happened seven years ago » would amount to using « intelligence » against the CIA. This conflates intelligence, of course, with oversight. Asking who knew what when is precisely the job of real oversight. But Panetta suggests asking such questions would put Congress and the CIA in an antagonistic role. It would ruin that flaccid consensus Panetta seems to want Congress to preserve. But in that statement is a threat. If you conduct oversight over us, Panetta seems to be saying, having now relabeled oversight as « using intelligence on each other, » we will do the same. […] You’ve got a choice, Panetta seems to be saying. Impotent consensus–which amounts to the same rubber-stamping of intelligence policies you did for the last eight years (but promise, we’ll be good!). Or intelligence, used on each other. A nice impotent consensus you’ve got here, Congress. It’d be a shame if anything were to happen to it. »

Unfortunately, these were only the forbearers of a rather conservative approach to intelligence oversight – not much different, actually, from that of the previous administration — which has caused the 9/11 commission to characterise intelligence oversight  as “dysfunctional”:

In Mid-March, for example,  the White House threatened to veto the pending FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act. In this bill, the democratic majority in the US Congress has finally managed to tackle two major flaws in the current system of US intelligence oversight – the “Gang of Eight” notification regulation for covert operations and the underwhelming resort to the investigatory expertise of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) by the congressional intelligence oversight panels. Yet the Obama Administration wants none of it. It threatens to veto the bill and prefers, instead, to stick to a system that everyone knows to be a sham. Glenn Greenwald, again, on the « Gang of Eight » rule:

« It allowed the administration to claim that it « briefed » select Congressional leaders on illegal conduct, but did so in a way that ensured there could be no meaningful action or oversight, because those individuals were barred from taking notes or even consulting their staff and, worse, because the full Intelligence Committees were kept in the dark and thus could do nothing even in the face of clear abuses. »

Conclusion

The path that the Obama administration has taken with regard to intelligence governance is neither in keeping with its earlier promise to restore constitutional values nor are we witnessing an unprecedented era of openness. While courting the notion of change initially, the administration has now made several steps backwards by embracing the old rhetoric of the Bush administration in fending off too robust intelligence oversight.

Granted, intelligence and openess do not go together very easily. Still, the continued celebration of oversight myths (such as the infamous « Gang of Eight » notification practice) deserves to be identified and criticised. What is more, the current American polity features virtually no real investigations into past intelligence malfeasances and interested citizens learn about problematic and unlawful activities only from the press. Thus the allegations remain – even the credible and egregious ones – remain forever alleged.  This is not the way to gain the trust of the electorate. Worse still, this may gradually undermine the countries’  social fabric.

Against this, one may argue that the quality of intelligence governance is not only to be determined by “good” but also by “effective” governance. As concerns the latter, a more assertive CIA (at least in its operations against Al-Qaeda) would count as a plus on the out-put legitimacy score of Obama’s intelligence governance. In turn, the compartmentalisation of the US intelligence community would then have to appear as a big minus on the same balance sheet. All this, however, goes beyond the scope of this commentary.

The fact is that intelligence accountability under Obama remains an illusion. At least in part this may be explained by the administration’s fear not to be perceived as too soft on security issues. The Republicans also know that they can influence the policy-making process by cooking up this image long enough. Dahlia Litwick calls this America’s special brand of terrorism-derangement syndrome:

« What was once tough on terror is now soft on terror. And each time the Republicans move their own crazy-place goal posts, the Obama administration moves right along with them. »

To end on a slightly more positive note, one may hope that the recent victory on the domestic public health front and the international praise for the new America nuclear posture reinvigorate the administration’s confidence in its own convictions. Last month, President Obama announced that

« We came to Washington to change the way business was done, and part of that was making ourselves accountable to the American people by opening up our government. »

Honni soit qui mal y pense?